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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the determinants of individual participation in informal 
financial groups (IFGs). The findings indicate that group characteristics are 
a primary factor explaining IFG participation, while transaction costs also play 
an important role. Results highlight the broad scope of individuals (by gender, 
age, occupation) participating in IFGs. 
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DETERMINANTS OF INFORMAL FINANCIAL GROUP PARTICIPATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CAMEROON 
by 
Carlos E. Cuevas and Gertrud R. Schrieder 
Introduction 
Informal finance.has been a subject of increasing attention for development 
economists in recent years. "Puzzled" by the fl ouri shment of informal finance 
where formal financial systems fail (Adams, 1989), several studies have focused 
on different forms of informal financial intermediation1 • Among these, informal 
financial groups (IFGs) have been the subject of both empirical research (e.g., 
Izumida, 1989, Schrieder and Cuevas, 1989), as well as interpretive essays (e.g., 
Callier, 1990, Von Pischke, 1989). 
In addition to documenting the relative importance of IFGs in funds 
mobilization in low ncome countries, the studies referred to above have raised 
several challenging, interrelated questions: (a) what is the appropriate 
theoretical framework to analyze IFG behavior and performance?, (b), what applied 
models can be formulat~d to explain group behavior and performance, and (c), how 
to model individual member participation in IFGs?. Addressong these questions 
in a recent article, Callier suggests that "the logic of ... (IFGs) is the logic 
of collective action, not the logic of the market ... " (Callier, 1990, p.274), 
referring to the limitations of the financial intermediation framework to explain 
the emergence of informal financial groups, and to account for the specific 
features of these groups. Although Callier is relying primarily upon the works 
of Olson on collective action (1965 and 1982), a number of alternative theoreti-
A collection of articles on informal finance is forthcoming in Adams, D. W, and D. Fitchett, editors. 
Informal Financial Markets in Low Income Countries. 
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cal frameworks can be proposed to explain group and/or membership behavior. The 
economic theory of clubs2 , and transaction-costs economics (Williamson, 1979) 
are among these approaches. Although not necessarily mutually exclusive, these 
two approaches may lead to different explanations of individual participation in 
IFGs: is it primarily the characteristics of the group, as a social and economic 
entity, that drives member involvement?, or is it primarily the individual's 
attempt to reduce the transaction costs associated with financial contracts what 
determines the extent of members partiicpation in IFGs? 
This paper attempts to address the questions above by providing an empiri-
cal insight into the determinants of individual participation in IFGs. The model 
relies upon data obtained among informal financial groups in rural Cameroon 
(Schrieder, 1989). The significance of IFGs in Cameroon has been documented 
elsewhere (Delancey, 1977, Schrieder and Cuevas, 1989), hence this paper will 
focus on analyzing the factors underlying the decision to participate in IFGs, 
as well as the factors explaining the degree of members' involvement in these 
groups. The following section presents the empirical model and briefly discuss 
the different groups of variables representing the explanatory factors associated 
with transaction costs and group characteristics. Subsequently, the results of 
the regression models are analyzed, before offering several concluding remarks. 
A Model of Informal Financial Group Participation 
The extent to which an individual is involved in financial self-help groups 
is measured here through three alternative indicators: (1), the number of IFGs 
in which the individual participates; (2), the amount of savings held by the 
individual in IFGs; and (3), the individual's total borrowing from IFGs. 
2 See the comprehensive review by Sandler and Tschirhart (1980). 
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Whereas the first indicator reflects the individual's natural propensity or 
willingness to participate in groups, the second and third measures of participa-
tion are more likely to capture the member's ability to contribute deposits and 
his/her credit worthiness in the informal financial group. 
It is hypothesized here that individual participation in informal savings 
and lending associations is determined by: (a), factors associated with the 
individual, and (b), factors pertaining to the informal financial group. The 
factors associated with the member ( i ndi vidua l) characteristics are in turn 
classified into three groups: personal and household characteristics, motivation 
to participate in IFGs, and access to alternative financial institutions. The 
latter reflects the opportunity cost for group members of performing financial 
transactions elsewhere, i.e., the transaction costs hypothesis for member 
participation. 
The second set of variables, which captures several IFG characteristics, 
represents the hypothesis that it is the nature of the group and the group 
dynamics what determine member involvement in IFGs. The chart below summarizes 
these factors and the related proxies that are postulated to influence an 
individual's decision to participate in informal financial groups. 
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Factors Explaining an Individual's Participation in 
Informal Financial Groups 
Factor Groups 
Factors Associated 
with the Individual 
Personal and 
household 
characteristics 
Initial motivation 
to particip";te 
Access to alter-
native financial 
institutions 
(Transaction costs) 
Factors Associated 
with the Group 
Explanatory Variables 
Age 
Gender 
Education 
Occupation 
Family size 
To obtain a loan 
To save 
To socialize 
Bank distance 
Access to loans from other institutions 
Access to alternative savings institutions 
Group age 
Group size 
Type of group 
Form of leadership 
Meeting sequence (monthly) 
Group common bond: ethnic group, and gender 
The following multiple linear regression model was specified to explain the 
relationship between participation (involvement) in IFGs and the explanatory 
factors described above: 
P = B1 + B2MA + B3MG + B ME + B5MO + BlS + B7LO + B8SA + B9SO + 
+ B10BD + B11 AL + B12AS + B13GA + B14GS + B15GT + B16GL + 
+ B17GF + B18BE + B19BG ( 1), 
where, P represents individual involvement in IFGs, measured through three 
alternative indicators: (a), the number of groups in which the individual 
participates, (b), the total savings held by the individual in informal groups, 
and (c), the total borrowing from IFGs. 
.. 
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The explanatory variables in equation (1) and their measurement are 
described as follows: 
MA Member age, years 
MG Member gender, male = 1, female = 0, 
ME Member education, literate= 1, illiterate= 0, 
MO Member occupation, farmer = 1, 0 otherwise 
FS Family size, number of members 
LO To obtain a loan as primary motivation, yes = 1, no = 0, 
SA To save as primary motivation, yes = 1, no = 0, 
SO To socialize as primary motivation, yes = 1, no = 0, 
BD Bank distance, kilometers 
AL Access to loans from alternative formal 
institutions, yes = 1, no = 0, 
AS Access to alternative savings institutions, yes 1, no = 0, 
GS group size, measured alternatively as 
total membership per group, number of members 
total group of savings (CFA'OOO), or 
total group lending (CFA'OOO), 
GA Group age, years of operation, 
GT Type of group, rotating = 1, non-rotating = 0, 
GL Leadership structure of group, board = 1, individual = 0, 
GF Meeting sequence (monthly) 
BE Group common bond, ethnic group = 1, 0 otherwise, 
BG Group common bond, gender = 1, 0 otherwise. 
The data used in the estimation of equation (1) correspond to 136 individu-
al interviews with members of informal financial groups in the North West, 
Central, and West provinces of Cameroon (Schrieder, 1989). 
Regression Results and Interpretation 
The results of the OLS estimation of equation (1) for the three definitions 
of the dependent variable Pare presented in Table 1. These results correspond 
to the definition of gr.cup size (GS) in terms of total group savings, which gave 
consistently the best goodness of fit for all three definitions of the dependent 
variable. 
The joint significance of the explanatory variables comprising each factor 
hypothesized as determinant of IFG participation is presented in Table 2. The 
F-ratios presented here test the joint null hypothesis that the B coefficients 
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associated with the variables in a given group (factor) are all equal to zero, 3 
against the alternative hypothesis that not all Bi are zero. 
Table 2 shows that group related factors are consistently significant for 
all three definitions of the dependent variable, while other factors appear as 
significant only to specific definitions of IFG participation. Access to 
alternative financial institutions is a significant factor for two of these 
definitions, whereas other factors associated with the individual are only 
significant for one definition. A discussion of each variable group follows. 
Personal and Household Characteristics 
The test results in Table 2 indicate that personal and household character-
istics do not determine significantly a person's decision to participate in 
several groups, or the individual's savings balances in these groups. However, 
this factor does appear to influence positively the amounts borrowed from IFGs. 
Among the individual variables comprising this factor, only occupation and 
family size show significant estimates in Table I. Although there is no evidence 
that occupation affects participation in IFGs (first column in Table I), farmers 
are significantly less engaged in informal savings as well as borrowing activi-
ties compared to non-farmers (second and third columsns). This finding can be 
associated with the lower income level of farmers relative to non-farmers. In 
addition, cash-crop farmers face a less steady flow of income which makes it more 
difficult for them to subscribe a fixed contribution regularly. Although food-
crop producers - traditionally women - have a steady flow of income, their income 
level is stilll lower relative to non-farmers. Therefore, farmers appear as 
likely to participate in IFGs as non-farmers but are not able to deposit as much 
3 e.g. the joint null hypothesis to test for the significance of the factor "personal and household 
characteristics" is B2=0, B3=0, B3=0, B4=0, and B6=0. 
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funds as other occupations do. Moreover, since the loan amount a group member 
is eligible to obtain is usually directly dependent on the member's total 
deposits, farmers not only save less but also are bound to borrow less as 
compared to non-farmers. 
Family size was found to significantly increase member's borrowing. This 
finding is consistent with both the widespread notion that loans from informal 
institutions are primarily spent for consumption purposes, as well as with the 
notion that family labor is a key cooperating factor in rural household invest-
ments. As family size increases, consumption expenditures increase, and the 
availability of labor increases, thus increases the overall demand for funds. 
Initial Motivation to Participate in IFGs 
This group of variables appears to significantly affect IFG participation 
when measured as the number of groups in which individuals participate. However, 
the motivation factor does not significantly influence the amount an individual 
chooses to save and borrow (see Table 2). The results presented in Table 1 
suggest that a person intending to save and to borrow in IFGs participates in 
more groups than a person whose primary intention is to socialize with the other 
members. 
Access to Alternative Financial Institutions 
The signifcance tests presented in Table 2 indicate that this factor 
strongly influences the number of groups in which an individual is involved. As 
expected, the participation in informal financial groups increases as distance 
to the nearest bank branch increases, thus reflecting the opportunity costs of 
performing financial transactions in formal institutions. Interestingly, access 
to alternative savings institutions does not reduce participation in multiple 
groups or the amount of informal savings and borrowing, while access to alterna-
8 
tive formal loan institutions does not show a significant effect on IFG partici-
pation {see Table 1). These results are consistent with the idea that informal 
finance is not indeed replaced by formal finance when this becomes available. 
Instead, IFG members will tend to diversify their asset and liability portfolios, 
and benefit from a better selection of financial services. It must also be 
recalled that in the ~orth West province of Cameroon, there is a strong and 
reliable credit union organization providng services to individuals as well as 
to IFGs as a group, integrating rather than substituting for IFG activity. 
Factors Associated with the Informal Financial Group 
As Table 2 indicates, group related factors significantly influence all 
three definitions of the dependent variable. In addition, all group-related 
parameter estimates with respect to the number of IFGs in which a person is 
involved are significant at the one percent level {Table 1). Well established, 
long standing savings and lending associations seem to discourage their members 
from participating in additional informal financial groups, while group size has 
the opposite effect on members' participation in IFGs. The larger the group, the 
greater the likelihood that a person eventually participates in other groups. 
This result supports the notion that the information advantages associated with 
IFGs tend to disappear as group size increases. Hence, members will tend to 
diversify their savings and borrowing options by contributing to a larger number 
of groups. 
People participating in groups with a monthly meeting frequency have an 
increased tendency to join additional IFGs. This result is explained by the fact 
that unexpected money needs are easier to satisfy if one belongs to several 
groups rather than to just one which in addition meets only once a month. 
Finally, it was found that members of savings and lending associations wherein 
' + 
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the ethnic group is the common bond participate in fewer informal financial 
groups, while their engagement in informal savings activities is significantly 
increased. In contrast, members of IFGs wherein gender is considered to be the 
common bond, tend to participate in more groups. These findings suggest that 
ethnicity is a stronger source of mutual trust than a common gender, since there 
would less of an incentive to diversify group membership when ethnic group is the 
common bond, than when gender plays this role. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has analyzed factors hypothesized to affect individual partici-
pation in informal financial groups in Cameroon. Three major remarks arise from 
this analysis. First, group characteristics appear as the more significant and 
consistent determinant of IFG participation. This suggests that research aimed 
at understanding IFG should focus on modelling group behavior and performance, 
in order to identify the factors that determine those group characteristics. In 
particular, the interaction between group size, mutual trust and information 
costs deserve special attention. 
Second, although less significant than group characteristics, transaction 
costs are also an important factor in explaining IFG involvement by individuals 
in rural areas. The fiFldings reported here support the notion of complementarity 
between informal and formal finance in Cameroon, a result probably due in part 
to the presence of a healthy credit union movement in the regions surveyed for 
this study. 
Finally, the lack of significant influence of personal characteristics such 
as age, gender, or occupation, on IFG participation reflects the wide range of 
individuals these organizations are capable of reaching. Hence, initiatives that 
10 
support informal finance must not alter the essential features of informal groups 
that allow them to gather such a diverse cross section of the rural population. 
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Table I 
Results of Regression Models 
Factors and 
related Engagement in 
explanatory No. of groups 
variables Estimate t-ratio 
Personal and 
household 
characteristics: 
Member age 
Member gender 
Member education 
Member occupation 
Famil v size 
Motivation: 
To obtain a loan 
To save 
To socialize 
Access to 
alternative 
fin. institutions: 
Bank distance 
Alternative loan 
institutions 
Alternative saving 
institutions 
Group related 
factors: 
Group age 
Group size 
Group type 
Group leadership 
Meeting sequence 
(monthly) 
Common bond: 
Ethnic group 
Gender 
Interceot 
Rz I 
F value 
* significant at .01 
o significant at .05 
+significant at .IO 
0.002 0.451 
-0.261 -1.420 
0.049 0.371 
-0.169 -0.650 
-0.002 -0.241 
0.750 2.595* 
0.473 2.3640 
-0.306 -2.3960 
0.674 3.827* 
-0.089 -0.497 
0.693 5.787* 
-0.041 -3.854* 
o·.309-6 3.528* 
-8.155 -2.926* 
-2.264 -4.046* 
8.623 3.756* 
-6.943 -4.086* 
8.022 3.641* 
-9.219 -3.171* 
0.632 I 11.166 
Deoendent Vari abl 1! 
Engagement in 
informal savings 
(in 1000 F CFAl 
Estimate t-ratio 
-1.437 -0.346 
180.732 1.138 
55.683 0.493 
-487.746 -2.2130 
2.080 0.299 
-358.298 -1.468 
-98.167 -0.570 
53.843 0.487 
-15.196 -0.852 
124.290 0.792 
183.415 1.635+ 
1.196 0.138 
2.425 1.082 
-390.563 -0.865 
395.812 0.813 
335.362 0.523 
771.577 2.3700 
439.621 0.725 
171.871 -0.228 
0.409 
4.490 I 
Engagement in 
informal borrowin g 
(in 1000 F CFAl 
Estimate t-ratio 
0.529 1.138 
62.244 0.435 
-45.117 -0.435 
-372.976 -1.843+ 
16.926 2.645* 
-75.217 -0.334 
208.700 1.337 
64.573 0.649 
-135.400 -0.987 
-137.610 -0.981 
158.804 I. 701+ 
0.382 0.047 
-0.001 -0.780 
1924.389 0.886 
11.494 0.026 
-2225.259 1.243 
870.582 0.657 
-2202.891 -1.282 
2941. 755 1.298 
0.561 
8.300 
12 
Table 2 
Significance of Explanatory Factors. Joint Tests of the 
Hypothesis B = 0, where B is a Vector of Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable 
Engagement in: 
no. of groups informal savings 
Factors 
F-value 
Personal and 
household 
characteristics 
Initial motivation 
to participate 
in IFGs 
Access to alter-
native financial 
institutions 
Factors associated 
with the informal 
financial group 
* significant at .01 
+ significant at .10 
0.530 
5.520* 
17.82* 
13,.82* 
activities 
Prob>F F-value Prob>F 
0. 7142 0.633 0.6398 
0. 0018 0.838 0.4759 
0.0001 2 .153+ 0.0974 
0.0001 3.015* 0.0060 
informal borrow-
ing activities 
F-value Prob>F 
2.064+ 0.0900 
0.826 0.4822 
1.340 0.2647 
4.029* 0.0005 
